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Abstract— Covert channels have the unique quality of masking 
evidence that a communication has ever occurred between two 
parties. For spies and terrorist cells, this quality can be the 
difference between life and death. However, even the detection 
of communications in a botnet could be troublesome for its 
creators. To evade detection and prevent insights into the size 
and members of a botnet, covert channels can be used. A 
botnet should rely on covert channels built on ubiquitous 
protocols to blend in with legitimate traffic. In this paper, we 
propose a covert channel built on the BitTorrent peer-to-peer 
protocol. In a simple application, this covert channel can be 
used to discretely and covertly send messages between two 
parties. However, this covert channel can also be used to 
stealthily distribute commands or the location of a command 
and control server for use in a botnet.  
Keywords: Computer Security; Covert Channels; BitTorrent; 
Botnets; Information Hiding 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cryptography is useful in providing message 
confidentiality, or preventing a third party from uncovering 
the content of a message. However, cryptography is not 
designed to hide evidence that the communication has 
occurred. For some applications, even the existence of a 
communication between two parties could have disastrous 
consequences. These applications must rely on covert 
channels to prevent a third party from uncovering evidence 
that a communication has occurred. The term “covert 
channels” was first coined by Lampson nearly 30 years ago 
[1]. These original covert channels operated on a single 
machine to send information from a high security level 
process to that of a low security level process. Today, the 
majority of computing devices are attached to a network. 
Network protocols can be used to create covert channels 
were messages can be sent to remote machines in a stealthy 
manner [2]. In most cases, covert channels make use of 
unintended characteristics of network protocols that can be 
used to store information. The number of network protocols 
and their complexities allows for the creation of an almost 
unlimited number of covert channels. 
Botnets are one possible application for covert channels. 
Botnets are groups of compromised machines that attackers 
control remotely for a variety of mostly malicious purposes. 
This includes conducting distributed denial of service 
attacks, sending spam messages, stealing account 
information, and conducting identity theft. Traditional 
botnets were controlled from an IRC server where the 
attackers could send commands to nodes of the botnet. 
However, this method is rarely used today as it presents a 
single point of failure for the botnet and they are more easily 
dismantled. As a result, malware writers have tried to devise 
better ways to control their army of compromised machines. 
Command and control over HTTP or HTTPS is common 
nowadays due to the prevalence of these protocols on the 
Internet. This makes identifying botnet traffic on the network 
more difficult. However, locating the command and control 
server is still a common failure point for botnets. For 
example, if they have static domain addresses programmed 
into the malware these can be null-routed and the botnet will 
go offline. This has led some malware writers to rely on 
DNS generation algorithms where DNS names are generated 
in a pseudo-random fashion. While these are more difficult 
to take down, it is not impossible. Another even more 
resilient method for botnet command and control relies on 
peer-to-peer network protocols [3]. This design completely 
decentralizes the botnet and makes it very difficult for 
defenders to track and dismantle. Malware authors will 
continue to explore resilient and stealthy methods to control 
botnets. Utilizing covert channels are another method that 
botnets use to elude detection from security researchers. 
BitTorrent is one example of a peer-to-peer protocol. In 
recent years it has exploded in popularity and is responsible 
for the majority of the Internet traffic in most regions of the 
world [4]. The high volume and common use of the 
BitTorrent protocol would make an ideal target for malware 
writers that wish to blend in with legitimate traffic. Also, 
most BitTorrent networks are open and require no 
authentication. Therefore, a covert channel in the BitTorrent 
protocol would be an ideal candidate for covert channels, 
especially in the case of botnets. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much research has been done developing new types of 
covert channels [2]. Some of these covert channels rely on 
the TCP protocol to hide information. For example, Rowland 
proposed hiding messages in the Initial Sequence Number 
(ISN) field of a TCP SYN packet [5]. This sequence number 
is used to synchronize TCP packets in a communication and 
is normally randomly generated for the first packet of a TCP 
connection. However, a covert message can be inserted into 
the ISN field instead before being sent to the receiver. Other 
covert channels utilize the DNS protocol to send hidden 
information. In one such channel, information is sent over 
DNS lookup requests to a fake DNS server [2]. The message 
is encoded in the hostname field of the lookup request. 
Research has also been done on categorizing types of 
covert channels and evaluating them based on common 
criteria. These criteria include the type, throughput, 
robustness, and probability of detection [6]. The most 
common types of covert channels are storage, timing, and 
behavioral based. The covert channel proposed in this paper 
can be considered a storage channel. Throughput measures 
the amount of information that can be sent over a given time 
interval. Covert channels can range from very low 
throughput rates of less than 10 bits per hour to high rates of 
megabytes per second. The robustness measures how 
resilient the covert channel as it proceeds through 
networking devices or other layers in the networking stack. 
Finally, detection measures how susceptible the covert 
channel is to detection from active listeners along the data 
path. Usually these criteria conflict with each other and a 
designer must select the most appropriate qualities for a 
given application. For example, generally as the throughput 
increases a covert channel’s probability of being detected 
also increases. 
The use of covert channels in botnet networks is not new. 
Johnson, Bo, and Lutz stated that malware authors might 
begin utilizing covert channels as a means to evade detection 
[7]. Also, Butler et al. proposed using a covert channel in 
DNS as a method for botnet command and control [8]. 
However, no published paper has documented the use of the 
BitTorrent network protocol directly. On the other hand, Li 
et al. proposed using torrent files to store covert messages 
[9]. Torrent files contain all of the necessary information 
needed to download a certain file, or collection of files, using 
the BitTorrent protocol. 
III. COVERT CHANNEL IN BITTORRENT 
A. Background 
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer protocol used for file 
sharing. Each user downloading a file also simultaneous 
uploads pieces that they have already received to other 
users. BitTorrent trackers are used so peers can locate other 
users that are downloading the same file. Users that are 
actively downloading files are known as leechers, while 
users that have completed downloading a file but remain 
uploading to other users are known as seeders. The 
BitTorrent tracker protocol operates over HTTP. Each 
torrent uses a unique SHA1 hash to identify the files or 
group of files that can be downloaded. After a user 
downloads and opens a torrent file, their BitTorrent Client 
will perform a GET request to the tracker. This GET request 
contains the info hash (unique SHA1) from the torrent file, 
the peer id of the client, an IP and port number of the client, 
an event message, a numwant field, among others [10]. At 
the start of the download the event message is “started.” The 
peer id field is 20 bytes of randomly generated characters 
unique to each client. The numwant field is the number of 
peers the client wishes to receive. Figure 1 shows an 
example announce request to torrent.ubuntu.com. As you 
can see, the info_hash and peer_id fields are URL encoded.  
 
 
Figure 1. Example announce request 
 
The tracker will respond to the client’s request in a 
standard HTTP format. Figure 2 shows the packet header of 
the tracker response. Typically, trackers will return a 
maximum of 50 peers per request. Trackers will respond 
with a list of peers that are currently seeding or leeching the 
requested file. If more peers are present than the amount 
requested, peers are selected by the tracker randomly. This 
response can be in two formats. Some trackers allow the 
client to choose the response type, while others force a 
specific response. The first response format is known as a 
dictionary response. In a dictionary response, the server 
sends a list of IP, port, and peer ids of clients currently 
seeding or leeching the file. This response is structured in 
the Bencode format and contains the IP and port numbers in 
decimal notation. Figure 2 shows an example dictionary 
response from the BackTrack Linux tracker.   The second 
response type is known as a binary or compact response. In 
a binary response, the server will respond with a list of IP 
and port numbers corresponding with other peers    in 
network (big endian) notation. This response is typically the 
default as it requires less bandwidth and is also encoded 
with Bencode. Figure 3 shows a binary response from the 
BackTrack Linux tracker. As you can see from the figure, 
the response is not human readable. Peers are listed in the 
response with 4 bytes for their IP address and 2 bytes for 
their port number. No delimiter separates each IP/port 
combination in the list. The binary response omits the peer 
ID field entirely. 
 
 
Figure 2. Tracker response header 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Tracker dictionary response 
 
 
Figure 4. Tracker binary response 
 
B. Proposed Covert Channel 
To covertly send messages using BitTorrent trackers, a 
client could hide information in the peer id field during an 
announce request. To receive the message, one could contact 
the same tracker with the same info hash used as the sender 
and perform another announce request. The target info hash 
and tracker must be established prior to sending/receiving the 
message. The receiver’s request would need to specify a 
dictionary type response. The server will respond with peers 
downloading the file which will include the peer ID of the 
sender containing the covert message. Figure 2 shows an 
example topology for this situation. The sender connects to 
the tracker’s web interface and sends an announce request 
with a peer id containing a covert message. This message is 
then stored in the tracker’s database. To retrieve this 
message, the receiver performs an announce request to the 
tracker in the same fashion as legitimate P2P clients. The 
server replies to the receiver with a list of clients active in the 
specified torrent. This reply will contain the covert message. 
In this covert channel, 20 bytes of information can be sent at 
a time. However, for a more legitimate looking covert 
channel, this could be reduced to 12 bytes. Most BitTorrent 
clients reserve a portion of the peer id field for an identifier 
of the client name and version number. For example, the 
uTorrent client begins its peer id with the string “-UT3130-“ 
where 3130 corresponds with version 3.1.3 [11]. The 
remaining 12 bytes are randomly chosen characters. 
Unfortunately, many trackers do not support the 
dictionary response format and therefore the peer id field 
will not be visible to the receiver. An alternative covert 
channel could utilize the IP field to send messages. The 
BitTorrent protocol allows clients to specify IPs other than 
that which the tracker sees in the connection. This feature 
allows clients to connect to the tracker through proxy 
servers or from the same side of a NAT device. An IPv4 
address is 4 bytes which allows 4 bytes of information to be 
stored in each announce request. For messages longer than 4 
bytes, the message can be split across multiple requests to 
the tracker. For each request, the peer id field must be 
different. Otherwise, previous bytes will be overwritten in 
the tracker’s database. The port field could be used as a 
sequence number for each message so the receiver can 
properly reorder the message chunks upon receipt. In order 
for the message receiver to differentiate between valid peer 
IP addresses or pieces of a covert message an XOR scheme 
was used to encode messages. The receiver could simply 
reverse the encoding mechanism and verify if the resulting 
message was composed purely of ASCII characters. 
However, this requires the original message only contains 
ASCII characters. 
 
Figure 5. BitTorrent tracker topology 
In an implementation of the covert channel using the IP 
field, we achieved a throughput rate of 20 bytes/second. A 
higher rate was obtained with the peer id field due to it 
allowing 5 times as many bytes than the IP field. Also, the 
peer id field covert channel has a higher degree of 
covertness. Hiding encrypted messages in the peer ID field 
would be impossible to distinguish from normal peer IDs 
due to their random nature. However, hiding messages in 
the IP field could be detected as these would resolve to IPs 
that are not actively participating in the download. 
Fortunately, most torrents will contain peers that cannot be 
contacted due to firewalls or peers that have closed their 
download client. We collected data across several popular 
ubuntu torrents to confirm this theory. Out of 1654 peers 
reported by the tracker, only 1517 could be contacted 
(91.7%). Additionally, some trackers are known to mix 
random IPs into their tracker responses to provide plausible 
deniability in file sharing lawsuits [12]. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
We created proof of concept code to test the validity of 
the proposed covert channels. In both cases, we were 
successful in sending messages over the proposed covert 
channels. The backtrack-linux.org tracker supports the 
dictionary response and was used to send messages over the 
peer id field. To send messages over the IP and port field, the 
tracker from etree.org was used. An interesting issue 
occurred if more than 50 peers were downloading the target 
file. It could not be guaranteed that the receiver would see 
the sender’s message with a single request. As a result, 
multiple requests were made to the server until the message 
was received. The selection of which torrent to rendezvous at 
is important for this reason. If the torrent has too many 
seeders and leechers then the message receiver is required to 
perform many requests to locate the message. However, if 
the torrent has too few seeders and leechers then plausible 
deniability is decreased. For most applications of this covert 
channel, I would expect a low number of total peers (<30) to 
be ideal. Also, torrents of copyrighted material would be less 
than ideal due to the higher possibility of monitoring (From 
the MPAA or other organizations). 
The tracker will provide a min update interval to the 
client as part of an announce request. This is the minimum 
amount of time a client should wait before performing 
another announce request. Typically, trackers will remove 
clients that have not announced for twice the min update 
interval. As a result, the messages need to be reposted within 
this time frame to ensure they remain on the tracker. Typical 
min update intervals are 1 hour. 
Both of these covert channels could be used in botnets. 
The BitTorrent trackers could be used as a rendezvous point 
for botnet clients and their controller. As an alternative to a 
domain name used to locate the IP of a command and control 
server, the IP address could send in the covert channel. This 
method would be more resilient to takedown than a domain 
name. One possible weakness that could be exploited to 
enumerate all nodes of the botnet would be to send the IP 
address of a monitoring server to the target tracker. This 
would be possible to anyone who knows the rendezvous 
locations and algorithm. To prevent insights into the size of 
the botnet and to prevent a possible hijack, public key 
cryptography could be used to sign the IP address. 
Unfortunately, utilizing 1024 bit RSA key would require 
almost as many bits for message signing and would be much 
too large for the covert channel. Elliptical curve 
cryptography (ECC) has the advantage of having an 
equivalent level of security with much smaller key sizes. For 
example, ECC with a 160 bit key offers the same level of 
security as RSA with 1024 bits [13]. Starnberger, Kruegel, 
and Kirda proposed using ECC in their botnet protocol with 
a 112 bit key [13]. This allows for 40 bit messages to be 
securely sent if a maximum cipher text length of 20 bytes is 
desired. Thus, a botnet controller could encode the command 
and control server using a single message in the peer id 
covert channel. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
The BitTorrent specification should be analyzed for other 
potential covert channels. Also, mitigation or detection 
procedures should be developed for the proposed covert 
channels in this paper. For example, trackers should 
disallow the dictionary model response. Also, trackers 
should not allow peers to announce from arbitrary IPs. The 
info hash field should also be investigated as the potential 
for a covert channel. Many trackers will begin tracking any 
info hash that is announced to it. Therefore, arbitrary 
information could be inserted in this field to store up to 20 
bytes of a message. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
BitTorrent is one of the most commonly used protocols 
on the internet. Covert channels exist in the BitTorrent 
protocol that can be used to send messages in a stealthy and 
resilient manner. These covert channels could be used by a 
botnet to distribute commands or send the location of a 
command and control server. 
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